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Abstract 
The intention of this paper is to discuss the rationale for Malaysian public universities to 
implement Performance Based Funding (PBF) mechanism. Here, the funding mechanisms are 
systems based on allocating a proportion of education budgets relative to specific performance 
measures such as course completion, credit attainment, and degree completion, instead of 
allocating funding entirely based on enrolment alone. The implementation of PBF mechanisms 
has recently become a topic of heated debate in the education sector worldwide which has also 
increased the interest of researchers and policymakers to work on it. Since almost no study has 
looked into the applicability of PBF in Malaysia with the aims to contribute knowledge and fill the 
gap in the current research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to answer the objective of 
this study. The positive functions of qualitative research methodology are to show that it can 
assist the researcher in obtaining in-depth information and to understand the subjective 
experience of the respondents. Thus, in this procedure, semi-structured interviews were adopted 
and targeted to obtain information regarding the applicability of the PBF mechanism from the 
budgeting and financial aspects. Participants who encompassed in semi-structured interviews 
were the senior officer from the Bursar Office of selected universities. The findings from the 
qualitative data showed that PBF mechanism is suitable to be implemented at Malaysian public 
universities. However, there were several issues that the government needs to be addressed before 
the PBF mechanism can be successfully implemented. 
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Contribution of this paper to the literature 
This study contributes to existing literature by discussing the rationale for Malaysian public 
universities to implement Performance Based Funding (PBF) mechanism. 
 
1. Introduction 
The implementation of PBF mechanisms is prevalent in developed or developing countries today. Malaysian 
government currently takes the initiative to implement PBF mechanisms as highlighted in the National Higher 
Education Action Plan 2007-2010, Tenth Malaysian Plan 2011-2015, Eleventh Malaysian Plan 2016-2020 and 
Malaysian Education Blueprint 2015-2025 (Higher Education) (MoHE, 2007a; EPU, 2010; EPU, 2015; MoHE, 
2015) . The implementation of PBF in higher education is justified with the concept that public funds should be 
used efficiently and effectively (Teixeira et al., 2014). In terms of efficiently, the universities are envisaged to 
maximise their output and performance, such as research output, institution rankings, and employability using the 
money allocated to them. In terms of effectiveness, the universities are envisaged to be responsible to their 
universities objective and their role to the nation such as to grant quality degrees and to perform basic and applied 
research. PBF was recommended in order to reduce the dependency of Malaysian public universities on funding 
committed by the government, which about 75 to 90 per cent (Berita, 2015). The implementation of PBF is also 
designed to stimulate competition between universities and at the same time increase autonomy, as highlighted in 
the government policy, accountability and the transparency required in spending public funds (MoHE, 2007a; 
EPU, 2010; 2015; MoE, 2015). Here, PBF is expected to alter the behaviour of the universities (Miller and 
Morphew, 2017). According to Kivistö (2005) the implementation of PBF aims to align the interests and goals of 
the universities with the government’s intended outcomes. Moreover, it forms a closer relationship between the 
government and universities. Hence, agency theory can be used to study the relationships between government and 
universities. There are two vital components that have been identified as contributing to the applicability of a PBF 
mechanism in a country, which is alignment to the government’s objectives and the level of understanding of PBF 
(Kaullychurn, 2009). Ahmad and Farley (2013b) pointed out that adequate autonomy and financial freedom should 
be given to universities before the implementation of PBF mechanism. Critical elements such as purpose, 
performance indicators, success criteria, indicator weights, allocation methods, and funding levels are also 
important to the establishment of PBF (Serban, 2000; Dougherty, 2018). 
 
2. Performance Based Funding 
PBF is recognised as a transformation approach from traditional funding. It is increasingly popular in higher 
education worldwide. It is a mechanism which emphasises on quality rather than quantity (Marks and Caruthers, 
1999; Ahmad, 2013). With PBF, universities are funded based on their actual performance such as the funding 
allocation is determined through the degree completion of students instead of the enrolment of students (Salmi and 
Hauptman, 2006; Hillman et al., 2013). As PBF ensures the funds are directly allocated to those universities with 
outstanding achievement, it can maximise the return on funding and taxpayer money (Klein, 2015). PBF can also 
create a competitive environment in academia as a result of universities compete for their performances for funding 
allocation, which therefore can stimulate academics to exert more efficiently (Taylor and Taylor, 2003; Umbricht et 
al., 2017).  
The implementation of PBF mechanisms is identified as the most frequently and probably effective method that 
can drive universities to behave following government’s desired objectives and outcome (Zusman, 2005; Schiller 
and Liefner, 2007). Besides, it shows the ability to improve the efficiency, accountability and quality of higher 
education institutions (Frølich, 2008). The implementation of PBF mechanisms is identified as the most frequent 
and effective method that can drive universities to follow and meet the government’s objectives and outcomes 
(Zusman, 2005; Schiller and Liefner, 2007). Additionally, it also shows the ability to improve the efficiency, 
accountability, and quality of HEIs (Frølich, 2008). In practice, there are four types of PBF mechanisms which are 
discussed below: 
 
1) Performance contracts 
Performance contracts are agreements between the government and the respective university after the level of 
funding and objectives have been determined and agreed (Strehl et al., 2007a). Salmi and Hauptman (2006) stated 
that even though this type of funding method is typically viewed as an incentive, it may also act as a punitive action 
if the university is unable to meet the agreed goals. Consequently, performance contracts may look like a good deal 
where the government is ‘buying’ a particular kind of performance from the university (Jongbloed, 2010; Ziskin et 
al., 2018). 
 
2) Performance set-asides  
Performance set-asides refer to the portion of a budget reserved for particular universities whose performance 
is being measured. This funding may be extracted from either the base funding or from an additional source (Miao, 
2012) and has been used by South Africa and the United States (Salmi and Hauptman, 2006). 
 
3) Competitive funding  
Competitive funding is a subset of PBF mechanisms. Funding will be given to those selected candidates with a 
successful proposal after being subject to a peer review (Ahmad, 2013). This funding method aims to improve the 
quality of academia and at the same time promote transparency and accountability in managing public funds (Salmi 
and Hauptman, 2006; Ziskin et al., 2018). 
 
4) Payment for results 
Payment for results is also an approach of PBF mechanisms where the amount of the funding is distributed 
based on the output or the output measured either through a formula or as a separate set of payments (Salmi and 
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Hauptman, 2006; Dougherty, 2018). This type of funding method has been implemented in Denmark, Norway, 
England, and the Netherlands (Salmi and Hauptman, 2006). 
 
2.1. Performance-based funding indicators 
PBF is a mechanism that involves specified performance indicators directly connected to the institution 
funding which reflects the public objectives rather than the HEIs need (Salmi and Hauptman, 2006). PBF aims to 
strengthen the initiatives that promote excellence in research as well as teaching and learning (T&L). Most of the 
HEIs across the globe have adopted PBF mechanisms that rely on performance indicators (Jongbloed and 
Vossensteyn, 2001; Dougherty, 2018). Performance indicators in the PBF mechanism are varied according to the 
appropriateness of the country's higher education system. Furthermore, Layzell (1998) stated that there are five 
primary uses for performance indicators which consist of monitoring, evaluation, dialogue, rationalisation, and 
resources allocation. Qualitative and quantitative performance indicators under the PBF mechanism are usually 
used to measure the quality of the research or teaching at the institution (Kaullychurn, 2009). Kivistö (2005) also 
stated several outcome indicators measure teaching activities such as the number of master’s degrees granted, 
number of study credits collected, number of exams passed or the number of graduates working in jobs related to 
their study field. Whilst the outcome indicators normally measure research activities such as the number of 
research publications, the number of doctoral degrees granted, or the number of patents received. In the following 
section, a summary of performance indicators used in higher education has been outlined in Table 1. 
 
Table-1. Summary of performance indicators.  
No Source Teaching Research 
1 Selected performance indicators in 
higher education 
Cave et al. (1989) 
 Cost per student or ratio 
 Value-added 
 Rate of return 
 Wastage and non-completion rates 
 Employment on graduating or 
after five years 
 Student and peer review 
 Number of research 
students 
 Publications patents 
 Research quality 
 Research income 
 Peer review 
 Reputational ranking 
2 Variables for analysing HEIs in 
Europe 
Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2007) 
 Number of undergraduate students 
 Number of undergraduate degrees 
 Number of PhD students 
 Number of PhD degrees 
 ISI publications 
 Other publications 
 Licensing revenues 
 Patents held 
 Spin-off companies formed 
3 Teaching and research indicators in 
Australia 
Guthrie and Neumann (2007)  
 Student load by category 
 Student load % of the sector 
 International student as % of the 
institution’s load 
 EFTSU (equivalent full-time 
students unit against targets) 
 Equity 
 Indigenous 
 Research income 
 Research publication 
 Research training scheme 
students by field of study 
 Research students by 
category 
 % students in high-cost 
places 
 Research student 
completions 
 The share of national 
completions and separations 
 Research training scheme 
over and under allocations 
   Source: Ahmad and Farley (2013b). 
 
2.2. Public University in Malaysia 
Malaysian public universities are country’s institutions or agents for societal development and human capital 
formation (Sirat and Kaur, 2010). By referring to the National Higher Education Strategic Plan beyond 2020, 
Malaysian public universities are divided into three categories, which are Research/Apex Universities (RAUs), 
Comprehensive Universities (CUs), and Focused Universities (FUs) where each category has its own 
characteristics and responsibilities (MoHE, 2007b). Up to date, out of a total of 20 public universities in Malaysia, 
there are five RAUs, four CUs, and 11 FUs. 
The main concerns around implementing a PBF mechanism are definitely the appropriate designs which 
involve the selection of the right indicators and measures to evaluate institutions and with the development of 
appropriate rewards programs (Salmi and Hauptman, 2006). Generally, PBF is introduced to control the 
institutions focus on particular outcomes and those institutions that are compliant with the government priorities 
are financially rewarded (De Boer et al., 2015). However, the choice of performance indicators appears to always 
emerge as the main controversial issue when implementing the PBF mechanisms (Jongbloed and Vossensteyn, 
2001; Dougherty, 2018). Furthermore, Ahmad et al. (2013a) pointed out that it is difficult to justify the criteria of 
priorities in determining the funding weights for each of the indicators. 
Therefore, in order to ensure the success and the effectiveness of implementing PBF mechanisms, Layzell 
(1998) summarised the factors required including (1) the number of performance indicators selected should be kept 
to a minimum as below 20; (2) the performance indicators should not be implemented in a top-down manner; (3) 
the development of the indicators should involve the faculty and the state legislature for long-term success; (4) one 
type of indicator model cannot be applied to all types of institutions; (5) qualitative measurement is preferable to be 
used rather than the quantitative measurement by the policymakers; (6) appropriate financial incentives should be 
allocated to every indicator and given to the qualified institutions; and (7) the results of the performance should be 
reported to the policymakers and the general public in a timely and understandable fashion. Furthermore, Kivistö 
(2005) stated that the indicators chosen by the government not only have to be relevant for measuring performance 
but also have to be liable to a broader social and economic environment. 
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Following this, the implementation of PBF mechanisms has shown a high potential in improving performance 
in higher education (Layzell, 1998). It has been highlighted that the implementation of PBF could improve 
efficiency and value for money, promote quality, and enhance the accountability of HEIs (Kaullychurn, 2009). 
Furthermore, the competitiveness of PBF could also act as a marketing tool which enables universities to compete 
against each other in order to obtain higher levels of funding and encourage the universities to offer a higher-
quality of teaching and research, as well as to foster educational and organisational innovation (Liefner, 2003). In 
order to enhance the universities’ performance, the funding relationship between the government and funded 
universities had been redefined by using PBF. Previous research has shown that one of the main factors which 
attribute to the reformation of government funding is the implementation of PBF (Schiller and Liefner, 2007; 
Ahmad and Farley, 2013b). Nevertheless, Schiller and Liefner (2007) stated that changing to a new funding 
mechanism is expected to alter the behaviour of the universities. The rising concern of using taxpayers’ money has 
resulted in the government urging the universities to be more economically astute whilst fulfilling the goals 
outlined in the government’s strategic plan (Lane and Kivisto, 2008). Therefore, funding can be used as a strategic 
plan to align the universities’ behaviour with the government objectives (Frølich et al., 2010). In addition, Ahmad et 
al. (2013a) have proposed three control methods that are applicable for the government to control the agents by 
creating efficient monitoring systems, instituting bonds and promissory arrangements, and lastly to establish 
effective financial incentives that link the rewards with the agents’ performances. 
 
2.3. The Rationale of PBF 
In practice, Malaysian public universities heavily rely on government funding for their operational and 
development expenditure. The funding is given to the universities on the basis of negotiation with the government 
(World Bank/EPU, 2007). A total of 90 per cent of the funding is contributed by the government for Malaysian 
public universities (Lee, 2000; MoHE, 2007b; Ahmad and Farley, 2013b). With reference to the Malaysian 
Education Blueprint 2015-2025 (Higher Education), Malaysia government was found to be the highest among 
other countries which funded about 7.7 per cent of its annual budget for the higher education sector (MoE, 2015). 
However, in reality, the increasing demand for efficiency and innovativeness in spending public fund has caused the 
use of the traditional method of funding to become inadequate (World Bank/EPU, 2007). Moreover, the traditional 
method of funding has resulted in an array of issues, including the level of funding does not in relation to 
performances of universities (World Bank/EPU, 2007) funding did not use efficiently and too much dependence on 
funding committed by the government (Berita, 2015). Indeed, governance and financing have been pointed out is a 
central issue to address while ensuring the development of Malaysian universities (World Bank/EPU, 2007).   PBF 
was found to be the most relevant method that can assist the Malaysian government in saving up to 10 to 30 per 
cent of the operational funds for public universities (World Bank/EPU, 2007). The connection between funding 
and performance is targeted to improve efficiency by encouraging institutions to reduce costs and eliminate low 
priority expenditures (Orr, 2005; Kaullychurn, 2009). Additionally, a recent study by Ahmad (2013) stated that 
PBF can aid the Malaysian government to reduce the goal conflict and information asymmetry with public 
universities. The results indicate that the universities’ objective is parallel with the government’s desired outcomes 
through the implementation of PBF mechanism. Besides, autonomy needs to be granted to universities as it plays 
an important role in the implementation of PBF (Kivistö, 2005; 2008; Ahmad, 2013). Autonomy is required for the 
universities to manage the funding which respect to their daily financial operation (Sirat, 2010).  
 
3. Research Methodology 
In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted to obtain information from the potential respondents. 
The population of this study included all Malaysian public universities. Furthermore, the samples used for the 
semi-structured interview were senior officer from the Bursar Office of selected universities. However, due to the 
ethical consideration and to enclose the identity of the selected universities, the results from the selected 
universities were coded as University A, B, C and D. In this study, participants who encompassed in semi-
structured interviews were the senior officer from the Bursar Office of selected universities. Senior officers from the 
Bursar Office are the most suitable resources used in this study as they possess the experience and knowledge in 
managing and preparing the budget of their university. Therefore, they were selected as participants in this 
research interviews to share their views or perspectives. The job scope for the Bursar Senior Officer is summarised 
in Table 2. 
 
Table-2. Job descriptions 
Position General Job Descriptions 
Bursar Senior Officer  Be responsible for managing the university’s budget. 
 Preparing operating budget. 
 Preparing distribution for management and development. 
 Adjustment and transfer if government agencies. 
 Responsibility for preparing the university’s budget report. 
 Advising on budgeting issues. 
          Source: Ahmad et al. (2013a). 
 
Four semi-structured interviews were conducted in four Malaysian public universities according to the 
university category, with one from RAUs, one from CUs, and two from FUs. The interview questions were 
validated by the supervisor. Interview sessions with the participant from each of the universities were conducted by 
using the face to face method and based on the participant’s availability. The interview sessions were carried out 
inappropriate languages and were recorded with the permission of the participants. The interview guidelines were 
sent to each of the participants via email before the interview session in order to give them an opportunity to 
prepare. All interview sessions lasted approximately one hour. 
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3.1. Data Analysis  
Interview sessions with the respondents from each category of Malaysian public universities were conducted 
based on the respondents’ availability. An Interactive Model which was proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) is 
shown in Figure 1 was used for data analysis when all the data is completely collected. 
 
 
Figure-1. Components of data analysis. 
                                       Source: Miles and Huberman (1994). 
 
The Interactive Model consists of three stages including data reduction, data display, and conclusion. Data 
reduction is the first stage of data analysis. In this stage, the data collected underwent the process of selecting, 
focusing, simplifying, extracting, and transforming (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Furthermore, only the data which 
is related to this study were taken into account and coded according to the themes that were drawn from the 
research questions. The second stage of the data analysis is the data display. In this stage, the data was displayed in 
the relevant form and arranged by using a matrix method. The data displayed in the data display matrices guided 
the researcher to draw the conclusions of the study relatively easily. Lastly, the data which is used for the 
conclusion was generated at the last stage of the data analysis and based on the research questions. In order to 
ensure the reliability of the conclusion, a cross-checking data process is carried out to verify the conclusion of the 
study. 
Findings from the semi-structured interviews are used to develop the items in the survey questionnaire form. 
The interviews were conducted at four participating public universities. One RAU, one CU, and two FUs were 
selected from each category of Malaysian public universities. In order to protect the identity of the universities, the 
name of the universities will not be revealed and they were labelled as University A, B, C, and D. In this chapter, 
the results of research question one, followed by a summary of the qualitative findings are presented. 
 
4. Discussion 
Government objectives were identified by participants as one of the major drivers that contributed to the 
implementation of a PBF mechanism. In the current study, government objectives comprise of monitoring the 
universities performances, reporting information on achievement, motivating the universities, reducing goal 
conflict and/or information asymmetry, and accountability and the transparency needed in managing public funds. 
The participants in the semi-structured interviews pointed out that the implementation of a PBF mechanism 
may see an increase in the level of monitoring activities by the government. The government can use all 
information obtained from the KPIs, monitoring and control mechanisms for monitoring the universities’ 
performances and for the purpose of the allocation of funds. To ensure the effectiveness of monitoring activities, the 
government is advised to provide clear guidelines before implementing a PBF mechanism. 
In addition, the results of this study indicated that the implementation of a PBF mechanism will increase the 
universities level of accountability and transparency in managing public funds. In addition, it will also improve the 
accuracy of the information provided by them with the adoption of KPIs, monitoring and control mechanisms. 
Results from the qualitative interviews found that the participants agreed that the implementation of PBF 
mechanism will motivate the universities to achieve their targeted KPIs. In contrast, the government needs to set 
the KPIs based on the circumstances of each university to avoid demotivating. Moreover, the implementation of a 
PBF mechanism needs to be driven by incentives. In addition, it is found that the universities will work more 
effectively in line with government objectives and will ultimately reduce information asymmetry and/or goal 
conflict because of the incentives provided. 
From the participant’s perspective, the level of understanding is regarded as the main variable in implementing 
a PBF mechanism. In this study, the level of understanding included an understanding of the PBF mechanism, the 
appropriateness of the PBF mechanism implementation, the platform to implementing the PBF mechanism, area 
focus on the implementation of PBF mechanism, and critical success factors for a PBF mechanism implementation. 
Here, a higher level of PBF understanding indicates a higher success rate of a PBF mechanism implementation. 
The results of this study indicated that the participants were aware of this PBF mechanism, and always align 
themselves with the government’s policy. The government goals to implement the PBF mechanism are clearly 
highlighted in the National Higher Education Action Plan 2007-2010, Tenth Malaysian Plan 2011-2015, Eleventh 
Malaysian Plan 2016-2020, and Malaysian Education Blueprint 2015-2025 (Higher Education). Results from the 
qualitative data show that there is a mixed perception of the appropriateness of a PBF mechanism implementation 
in Malaysian public universities. In contrast, it is found that the majority of the participants’ universities in the 
interviews agreed that a PBF mechanism is the appropriate tool to be implemented in Malaysian public 
universities. 
The study has found that the categorisation of Malaysian public universities can be used by the government as 
a platform to implement a PBF mechanism. This argument is based on results obtained from the semi-structured 
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interviews with the participants. However, the same targets should not be set for different university category 
when implementing this PBF mechanism. This is due to each university category has its own nature and 
specialisation. Moreover, the results from this study demonstrated that the participants have different viewpoints 
on the area that should be focused on the implementation of PBF mechanism. This is due to the fact that the 
government currently implemented categorisation to Malaysian public universities. Furthermore, the qualitative 
data further explored the critical success factors for the PBF mechanism implementation. The participants from the 
universities identified that readiness, autonomy, management, incentives, and comprehensive framework and 
foundation are the factors that contributed to the success of PBF mechanism implementation in Malaysian public 
universities. 
In relation to the government initiative to implement PBF mechanism in Malaysian public universities, 
participants agreed that PBF mechanism could improve the accuracy of the information from public universities to 
the government even more. This was then further supported by a participant from University C but noted that the 
measurement mechanism should be carefully selected. For example, the information should not extract from the 
questionnaire. This is due to every respondent has their own interpretation towards the questionnaire received 
which may cause the information collected to become inaccurate. 
Next, findings collected from the semi-structured interviews showed that participants have similar perception 
and agreed that PBF mechanism will lead to increase in monitoring activities by the Malaysian Federal 
Government or Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) as a principal. However, participants from University A and 
B further pointed out that the government needed to have an early preparation before they can monitor the 
universities. 
Additionally, findings from the participants indicated that the PBF mechanism could increase the level of 
accountability and transparency of public universities in managing public funds. Furthermore, as universities are 
funded by the public, a participant from University D further reported that public universities must have the 
responsibility to be transparent and accountable. They cannot compromise on this matter. They are requested to 
ensure that the funding is able to contribute to better performance. 
Meanwhile, findings collected from the semi-structured interviews also indicated that PBF mechanism could 
increase the motivation of the public universities. The university will try to achieve the KPI and at the same time 
provide the training to the staff as stated by participant from University D. However, participants from University 
B and C also noted that PBF mechanism may bring negative effect to the universities if the government do not set 
the KPIs according to the conditions of each university. However, participants in this study stated that autonomy 
should be followed with the implementation of PBF mechanism at Malaysian public universities. They are critically 
desired to be given autonomy by the government. The autonomy given could allow them to manage their 
university funding with the KPIs set by the government.    
This study produced results that confirmed the findings of a substantial amount of previous work that 
examined the significance of government objectives in enhancing the success of a PBF mechanism implementation. 
These findings are in agreement with numerous studies such as Ahmad et al. (2013a) and Kaullychurn (2009) which 
show a positive relationship between government objectives and PBF mechanism implementation. More 
importantly, this study supports the argument that the implementation of a PBF mechanism may show an increase 
in the monitoring activities by the government (Ahmad, 2013) an increase in the level of accountability and 
transparency by the universities in managing public funds (Kaullychurn, 2009; Friedel et al., 2013) improve the 
accuracy of the information provided by the universities (Ahmad, 2013) motivate the universities to achieve their 
KPIs (Dougherty and Reddy, 2011) as well as reducing information asymmetry and/or goal conflict (Verhoest, 
2005; Ahmad, 2013). Additionally, the findings of this study also provided additional evidence that incentives 
should be provided along with the implementation of a PBF mechanism to make universities work more effectively 
in line with government objectives and ultimately reduce information asymmetry and/or goal conflict (Verhoest, 
2005). 
 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, several advantages were identified could increase the rationale for Malaysian public universities 
to implement PBF mechanism. There are altogether four advantages, which are PBF mechanism could improve the 
information accuracy given by the public universities, increase in monitoring activities, increase the level of 
accountability and transparency of public universities in managing public funds and lastly increase the motivation 
of the public universities. However, the results also revealed that autonomy is found to be an important element 
that contributes to the successfulness of PBF mechanism implementation. 
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